Non-wage benefits, corporate ownership and firm performance in post-communist economies: evidence from Ukraine by Michelotti, Marco et al.
 DRO  
Deakin Research Online, 
Deakin University’s Research Repository  Deakin University CRICOS Provider Code: 00113B 
Non-wage benefits, corporate ownership and firm performance in post-
communist economies: evidence from Ukraine 
Citation of the final article:  
Michelotti, Marco, Vocino, Andrea, Gahan, Peter and Roloff, Julia 2017, Non-wage benefits, 
corporate ownership and firm performance in post-communist economies: evidence from 
Ukraine, International journal of human resource management, vol. 28, no. 20, pp. 2861-
2892. 
 
 
 
 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in International 
Journal of Human Resource Management on 29 Jan 2016, available at:  
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09585192.2016.1139617 
© 2016, Informa UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Downloaded from DRO: 
http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30081075 
 1 
NON-WAGE BENEFITS, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND FIRM PERFORMANCE IN 
POST-COMMUNIST ECONOMIES: EVIDENCE FROM UKRAINE 
 
ABSTRACT 
The economic reforms in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe have fundamentally 
reshaped ownership and governance of economic production, notably through the privatization of 
former state-owned enterprises. These reforms were expected to transform management practices by 
displacing ‘cradle-to-grave’ welfare arrangements administered by state-owned enterprises. Using 
data drawn from two large samples of Ukrainian establishments, we investigate, in two different time 
points, the relationship between non-wage benefits and firm performance during the period of 
transition to a market economy (1994 to 2004). We found that non-wage benefits continued to be a 
critical key of HRM practices in Ukraine during this period, and were positively associated with firm 
performance. 
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1. Introduction 
The collapse of the planned economies in Central and Eastern European (CEE) and the 
associated transition to market-based systems of economic governance have produced 
enduring effects at the societal, organizational and individual levels. In particular, the 
relationship between state and economic production has been completely reshaped following 
wide-ranging economic and political reforms, many of which aimed to both stabilize poor 
macro-economic performance and re-organize the allocation and ownership of productive 
assets. While these policies reflecting the process of economic reform have varied greatly 
across post-communist countries, their objectives were similar in that they sought to introduce 
a market-based system of production by privatizing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
encouraging foreign direct investments (FDI).  
One fundamental consequence of these reforms that was not promptly addressed by policy 
makers and managers has been the impact of the privatization of SOEs and the adoption of 
western-style human resource (HR) practices on employees, much of which has been 
associated with a diminution of labour standards and the removal of traditional forms of 
welfare provision for employees. This was the case because under the communist regime 
most non-monetary welfare benefits, such as housing, health, food and retirement pensions 
were typically provided directly to employees by the SOE which employed them. In contrast, 
privatized establishments were not necessarily bound by such commitments. Another critical 
aspect that has received little attention has been the question of the extent to which these 
changes have influenced firms’ performance. Surprisingly, there is little empirical evidence 
that can be used to understand how this process unfolded, its implications for workers, and the 
effects on performance. 
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In order to investigate these issues, the aim of this paper is to address three questions. First, to 
what extent have changes in corporate ownership, which were brought about as a 
consequence of economic reform, influenced the use of HR practices traditionally associated 
with state-owned enterprises? Second, have these changes influenced the relationship between 
firm-level management practices and establishment performance? Third and finally, to what 
extent have trade unions influenced both the delivery of non-wage benefits and establishment 
performance? In order to answer these questions, we utilize a unique establishment-level, 
longitudinal dataset that was developed in Ukraine by the International Labor Organization. 
This data allows us to compare two representative samples of establishments in 1994 and 
2004. 
2. Privatization and forms of corporate ownership in post-communist Ukraine 
Until 1991, Ukraine was formally integrated into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). 
Like other CEE countries, its economic system of governance was dominated by centralized allocation 
of resources and investment across state-owned and run enterprises. In the absence of markets and 
price signals, firm production and investment decisions were determined centrally and reflected 
planning priorities aimed at supplying domestic consumption. As a soviet satellite economy, Ukraine 
became a major center for heavy machinery and industrial production (notably, mining, steel-making 
and agricultural machinery), much of which remained important after the collapse of central planning. 
Following the declaration of independence in 1991, Ukraine experienced a deep recession, with gross 
domestic product (GDP) falling, on average, by 9.2 per cent throughout the period 1994 to 1999, and 
inflation running at 417 per cent over the same period. Notwithstanding this dismal economic record, 
officially, unemployment remained low (World Economic Outlook 2012), which, to a large extent, 
reflected a widespread practice of placing workers on unpaid leave rather than dismissing them. The 
unemployed workers were, thus, able to retain access to a range of social welfare benefits, such as 
housing and health care, which were tied to employment (ILO 2004). 
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As with other CEE economies, international institutions and foreign governments encouraged and 
financed the Ukrainian government’s privatization reforms. In contrast to the rapid process of 
privatization that took place in Russia and in a number of other CEE countries, however, under its first 
elected President, the process of economic reform in Ukraine was more gradual (Pivovarsky 2003).  
Privatization formerly commenced with a series of laws in 1992 which established a State Property 
Fund to oversee the process, but the actual rate at which large and smaller SOEs were privatized was 
slow.  
As a centrally planned economy, Ukraine had no established corporate law, and no tradition of 
commercial regulation or contract enforcement. Whilst a number of CEEs were able to restore 
corporate codes from the pre-communist era, Ukraine had no prior corporate law and no social rules or 
civil traditions that supported private ownership. Pivovsrsky (2003) notes that this required Ukraine to 
establish a functioning corporate code, as well as judicial capacity to administer it prior to 
implementing privatization.  By the mid-1990s, both of these appear to have developed to a sufficient 
degree to support privatization.  As Figure 1 indicates, just 30 privatizations took place in the first 
year, representing around 0.2 per cent of all SOEs (Brown, Earle, Telegdy 2006). By 1994, however, 
the year of our first survey data, more than 8,000 privatizations had taken place, representing around 
8.2 per cent of all former SOEs. Privatization increased rapidly during the mid-1990s, before declining 
during the latter half of the decade. By the end of the 1990s, more than 66,000 former SOEs had been 
privatized. Overall, the newly-formed private sector firms accounted for around 60 per cent of GDP, 
and remained at around 65 per cent through the first half-decade of the 2000s (see Figure 2). By 2004, 
the second year for which we have data, more than 90,000 privatizations had been implemented 
(Pleines 2008), accounting for around 85 per cent of all SOEs that had existed prior to commencement 
of privatization in 1992 (Brown et al. 2006). 
--------------------------------------------------- 
FIGURES 1 & 2 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------------- 
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In Ukraine, the process of privatization was broadly similar to that which occurred in Russia: most 
large SOEs were privatized in a staged process. Following the collapse of centralized planning in the 
late 1980s, decision-making over SOEs’ assets was devolved to managers and work collectives, who 
were then given significant influence over the process by which the enterprise was to be privatized, 
including the opportunity to lease enterprise assets initially, leading to eventual transfer of ownership 
(Pivovarsky 2003). Managers and workers were first offered a proportion of all shares (in return for a 
defined share of profits for a fixed period of time). The remaining shares were allocated to other 
categories of citizens and “outsider” shareholders through a commercial auction or tender process 
(sometimes for a set price) and, in some cases, the state retained ownership of a controlling interest in 
the enterprise (Closed Joint Stocks). Frequently, the effect of this procedure was to promote “insider 
privatization” in which the majority of shares in the enterprise were either transferred or sold to 
managers and workers, with limited influence from “outsider” shareholders such as foreign investors 
(Fuxman 1997; Lhabitant and Novikova 2000). 
This did not, however, always occur.  In many instances, particularly following the election of a new 
government in 1999; the State Property Fund elected to dispose of SOEs shareholdings through a 
commercial process that encouraged outsider shareholding. Typically, these offerings were executed 
through auction or tender processes and investors paid cash (Open Joint Stocks). Not surprisingly, this 
revised process for privatization led to a significant increase in institutional and foreign ownership of 
privatized enterprises, although compared to a number of other CEEs the proportion of private firms in 
foreign hands remained relatively modest (Pivovarsky 2003). Small and medium-sized businesses 
were privatized either through commercial or non-commercial bids requiring bidders to agree on 
certain terms and conditions through auctions where the script was sold to the highest bidder, or via 
management/employee buyouts (Lhabitant and Novikova 2000). 
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3. Prior Literature Examining the Consequences of Privatization in Transition Economies 
Relationship between Privatization and Firm Performance 
The rationale behind this process was that private ownership was ultimately expected to improve 
corporate performance. Such reasoning was – and to a large extent still is – supported by theory and 
empirical evidence (Driffield et al. 2013). At a conceptual level, agency theorists assume that both 
external factors, such as the existence of competitive markets for managers, capital control and 
corporate control, as well as internal factors, which include managerial participation in ownership, 
reward-for-performance systems and the board of directors, would work to mitigate selfish behavior 
on part of managers (agents) while simultaneously enhancing their accountability to stakeholders 
(Dharwadkar, George and Brands 2000; Laffont & Tirole 1993; Sappington & Stiglitz 1987; Veldman 
2013). This, in turn, was expected to improve performance as it induced changes in corporate 
governance and management practices. 
The central tenet of agency theory was also supported by the public choice view of privatization, 
which maintains that politicians will impose objectives on SOEs that will help them to gain votes, but 
which may ultimately diminish their efficiency. Importantly, public choice theorists argue that other 
stakeholder groups, such as trade unions, may benefit from public ownership of enterprises, as SOEs 
are an easy target for rent-seeking behavior. Privatization was therefore expected to change the goals 
of a SOE by diminishing the power of political actors and social considerations while simultaneously 
encouraging the search for greater economic efficiency (Buchanan 1972; Shleifer and Vishny 1994; 
Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny 1996). 
At the empirical level, there is a vast body of literature that has examined the relationship between 
privatization and firm performance. In general, such an effect is shown to be positive although 
considerable variance remains. Meta-reviews of research examining the consequences of privatization 
have tended to indicate that privatized firms become almost invariably more efficient, as privatization 
is often associated with extensive restructuring (Cuervo and Villalonga 2000; Djankov and Murrell 
2002; Erakovic and Wilson 2005; Megginson and Netter 2001; Parker 1995). More recently, 
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longitudinal estimates have revealed positive effects of privatization on firm performance in Hungary, 
Ukraine, Romania and Russia (Brown, Earle and Telegdy 2006), while disconfirming a relationship 
between enterprise restructuring and job losses (Brown, Earle and Telegdy 2010). 
That is not to say there is no controversy surrounding these results, particularly when mediating 
factors such as imperfectly competitive labor and commodity markets (Vickers and Yarrow 1988), the 
lack of stable legal and institutional frameworks, and the absence of efficient capital markets and 
corruption (Barberis, Boycko, Shleifer and Tsukanoza 1996; De Castro and Uhlenbruck 1997) are 
taken into consideration. This seems to be particularly the case in the Confederation of Independent 
States  (CIS) where meta-reviews show that  privatization yields positive results particularly if the new 
owner is foreign or if there is a strong affiliation with business groups (Estrin, Hanousek, Kocenda and 
Svejnar 2009; Estrin, Poukliakova and Shapiro 2009). However, at an aggregate level empirical 
evidence suggests that privatization may ultimately have a positive effect on firm performance 
(Brown, Earle & Telegdy 2006; Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski 1999; Megginson & Netter 
2001). 
An important consequence that was associated with privatization of SOEs in many CEEs was a 
marked decline in real wages (Fleisher, Sabirianova and Wang 2005). This was certainly the case in 
Ukraine where wages fell incessantly while employment stagnated (Fleisher et al. 2005). The reasons 
for these developments are reasonably intuitive: as new owners strive to increase productivity and 
lower costs, they would reduce the high fixed costs associated with traditional welfare schemes and 
adopt performance-based HRM practices. In the short term, the overall aggregate effect on wages will 
be negative, at least for unskilled and semi-skilled employees (Blanchard and Aghion 1996; Handel 
and Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny 1996; Osterman 2006; Whyman, Baimbridge, Buraimo and Petrescu 
2014). These theoretical predictions provide mixed results when tested. The predictions range from 
qualified negative effects on wages (; Grosfeld and Nivet 1999; Haskel and Szymansky 1993) to 
positive effects, but only when the new owner is foreign (Brown et al. 2010). 
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SOEs, Non-wage Benefits and Social Security Reform in Ukraine 
Ukraine’s social security system was modelled on the Soviet system (ILO Socio-Economic Security 
Programme 2004; Standing and Zsoldos 1995). These arrangements consisted of the provision of 
highly subsidized prices on food, housing, transport and basic services. A central feature of this system 
included conditional eligibility for a wide range of social security benefits based upon a person being 
employed; and the provision of such benefits directly by the SOE to its own employees (Cazes and 
Nesporova 2004). 
In a country with unemployment nominally at zero, and where there was a right and a duty to have a 
job, this system ensured that most households had access to social security benefits. This was, in turn, 
reflected in the structure of remuneration packages for both blue and white collar workers, which 
included a wide range of non-monetary benefits – such as housing, subsidized food and rent, 
kindergartens and health services. A consequence of this arrangement was that direct monetary 
remuneration payments were typically low and not linked to productivity. Indeed, stagnant or 
decreasing real wages were often offset by improvements in non-wage benefits. 
Wage differentials were also minimal as wage bargaining was limited to industry or regional levels 
with emphasis being placed on procedures that rewarded seniority, rank and work related health risk 
(e.g. in mining and steel making) rather than productivity, skills and training (Komai 1994). In 
general, blue collar workers and senior officers in the army earned higher incomes than white collar 
employees, although both groups enjoyed a considerable level of non-wage benefits. This again 
caused a shortage, at times, of skilled labor as incentives to undertake further studies and training were 
not rewarded at the firm level (Komai 1994). 
The significance of non-wage benefits in the traditional remuneration arrangements in SOEs produced 
enduring effects once the planned system was dismantled and replaced by private ownership. In 
Ukraine in particular, there have been well-documented adjustment problems for a number of reasons. 
First, the old system of enterprise-based social benefits created attachment of workers to their place of 
work, which retarded labor mobility and hampered attempts to introduce performance pay in both 
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private and public enterprises. As a consequence, labor turnover remained low following the 
introduction of economic reforms. These problems were exacerbated by several factors that included 
institutional delays in creating an operational labor market, stagflation, falling real wages (not in all 
sectors or regions, though) and a chronic difficulty, in both private and public establishments, to pay 
remunerations. Second, reforms to the social security system, which were expected to offset some of 
the costs associated with providing extensive firm-based non-wage benefits, proceeded slowly and 
were plagued by both macro- and micro-economic problems and inefficiencies (Filatotchev, Buck and 
Zhukov 2000; Gibson 1996; Havrylyshyn et al. 1994; Lhabitant and Novikova 2000; Pivovarsky 
2003). 
Falling real wages and late payments were accompanied by a decline in state social protection 
caused by the lack of funding. Health services and unemployment benefits were often only 
obtained through a complicated bureaucratic process and the payment of bribes ( Barr and Field 
1996; Healy and McKee 1997; Round and Williams 2010). As a result, informal networks 
developed, which were characterized by informal payments, informal employment and 
underreporting of earnings from regular employment and business activities (Williams and 
Round, 2008). In this environment, non-wage benefits continued to play an important role also 
for privatized firms, as access to state-provided services became restricted. Non-wage benefits 
also contributed, to a large extent, to the growth of socio-economic inequalities as access to 
entitlements became limited to managerial and regular workers. This development prompted the 
ILO to warn, in 2000, that in Ukraine  
‘Enterprise-based benefits may become a bigger factor in the growth of 
inequality than wage differentials. Indeed, although much has been made of the 
enormous growth in income inequality in countries of the former Soviet Union, 
if the changing incidence of enterprise benefits were taken into account, growth 
in inequality would be much greater’ (ILO 2000:42). 
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Given the influence non-wage benefits had for the development of both Ukrainian 
management practices and the privatization of firms, we now turn to review the literature that 
links ownership structure, non-wage benefits and performance.     
Privatization, Unions and the Provision of Non-Wage Enterprise Benefits 
While the economic and management literature provides valuable insights into the relationship 
between changes in corporate ownership and performance, and the extent to which privatization may 
affect wages and employment, only few studies have examined the consequences for enterprise-based 
benefits associated with social welfare arrangements in centrally-planned economies. There appears to 
be a dearth of research investigating the potential role of unions in influencing these relationships. 
This scarcity reflects, to a large extent, the difficulties in obtaining reliable longitudinal data in 
transition economies. 
Despite this deficiency, there are a number of current largely obsolete studies that provide insights into 
these questions. For example research investigating the consequences of privatization in Anglo-Saxon 
countries during the 1980s and 1990s show that, generally, it was associated with a deleterious effect 
on benefits such as employer sponsored retirement assistance, workers’ compensation, meal vouchers 
and seniority based allowances (see, for example, Pendleton 1999; Heseltine and Silcock 1990). The 
explanation for these results is similar to the one used to clarify the negative relationship between 
privatization and wages: as privatized firms strive to adjust their cost structure to compete with lower-
cost competitors, and to increase productivity, they introduce innovative reward systems and work 
arrangements so that both wage and non-wage benefit levels become more linked to individual 
performance than before. As a result, ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ are created as skilled full-time employees 
are rewarded at the expenses of temporary and unskilled workers. This conclusion is supported by 
Chong and Leon (2009) who, in an empirical study that utilizes a large sample of privatized firms in 
75 countries (N=35,262), found that non-wage benefits tend to decrease following privatization, but 
only for unskilled workers and employees on temporary contracts. This is so because non-wage 
benefits become linked to performance and productivity gains.    
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A number of studies have also focused on privatization and the adoption of western-style 
HRM practices in former SOEs in transition economies of CEE countries and China. 
Although this literature is vast (particularly in relation to China) relatively little is said about 
the effects of privatization on non-wage benefits. A common finding across most of these 
studies is that many non-wage (social welfare) benefits that were associated with SOEs were, 
to varying degrees, retained along-side new HRM practices (Buck, Filatotchev, Demina and 
Wright 2003; Estrin, Shaffer and Singh 1997; Gahan, Michelotti and Standing 2012). 
In one of the earliest studies, Estrin et al. (1997) found that a wide array of non-wage benefits 
continued to be provided by a panel study of 200 manufacturing firms in Poland, irrespective of 
ownership type. Moreover, they found that retention of such benefits was associated with firm 
performance and higher wages. Similarly Buck, Filatotchev, Demina and Wright (2003: 532) found 
that specific non-wage benefits, such as housing and rent assistance, continued to be a critical attribute 
of HRM pay systems in Ukraine, but that such practices were mostly, but not exclusively, used in 
SOEs or recently privatized firms to foster productivity. Other studies have also considered the extent 
to which non-wage benefits have been retained in Central and Eastern European countries. The general 
findings are that non-wage benefits continued to play an important role in these countries although 
some differences persist. Specifically, there seems to be greater variation in the ways these benefits are 
offered by firms in central European countries than in nations from the former USSR. For example, 
small newly privatized firms in the Czech Republic and Hungary tend to offer fewer benefits than 
SOEs or larger firms that have been privatized for a longer period of time (Filer, Schneider and 
Svejnar 1997; Rein and Friedman 1997). Firms in the Czech Republic and Hungary are also more 
selective in relation to the type of benefits they offer with complementary pension and health 
insurance being the most common entitlements. By contrast, firms in Russia and Ukraine seem to be 
characterized by a significant inertia in that they still provide a large range of benefits including health 
services, subsidized food, housing assistance and in kind payments (Commander and Jackman 1997; 
Tratch and Worgotter 1997). A common finding across this body of research work is that non-wage 
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benefits have often been bundled together with wages and innovative HRM practices in a mix 
intended to increase productivity and introduce performance based reward systems.  
Other studies have, however, raised questions as to the real motives for benefit retention (Brainerd 
1998, Commander and Shankerman 1997). One of the common arguments supporting these 
perplexities is that firms that encountered financial difficulties during the restructuring period and 
could not pay their workforce would replace wages with non-wage benefits (Brainerd 1998, 
Commander and Shankerman 1997).  There is therefore a need to investigate how enterprise benefits 
have been used as wage substitutes. This is a particularly important issue in SOEs because these firms 
have been plagued with financial problems and difficulties in paying wages. Extant empirical evidence 
is scarce and quite inconclusive in this respect. Some studies indicate that there is a positive 
relationship between wage and non-wage benefits as firms paying higher wages and other monetary 
incentives such as bonuses are also likely to provide a wide array of non-wage benefits. However, 
other studies show a weaker or negative relationship particularly in firms in transition economies since 
non-wage benefits are used as substitutes for wages. This, if confirmed, would overstate any positive 
relationship that is found between exogenous and endogenous variables. 
This study also investigates whether or not trade unions have had an effect on the delivery of non-
wage benefits. We included this analysis as a matter of consistency and to be able to compare our 
results with the findings of Estrin et al. (1997) who explored the effects of privatization and trade 
unions on the delivery of non-wage benefits in Poland.  There is a vast literature that considers the 
effect of trade unions on wages and other benefits. Such literature suggests that the union effect on 
wages tends to be positive although this conclusion needs to be qualified on several grounds.  In 
particular, the union-wage effect tends to be greater for unskilled than for skilled workers, for older 
than for younger employees, for permanent than casual workers and for less than more educated 
employees. Such an effect also extends to a range of fringe benefits such as pensions, accident health 
and life insurance (Fitzenberger, Kohn and Lembecke 2013; Magda, Marsden and Moriconi 2012; 
Freeman and Medoff 1984).  
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Several competing perspectives have been provided to clarify the origin of that effect. Rooted in 
neoclassical economic theory, the monopoly face of unions postulates that trade unions raise both 
wages and non-wage benefits above market clearing levels by controlling the supply of labor (Booth 
1995). At a more general level, unions are deemed to increase wages and non-wage benefits for three 
main reason: First, employers respond to monopoly demands by hiring unionized workers who are 
paid at a higher rate than what would be normally determined by the market (Booth 2005); Second, 
collective bargaining agreements introduce ‘restrictive work practices’ as they contain clauses about 
staffing levels and work allocation. These, in turn, raise costs by increasing wages and other non-wage 
benefits and reduce output (Altman 2001). Third, wage bargaining is often accompanied by strikes and 
other forms of  industrial action which, by disrupting output, increase wage and non-wage costs for the 
employers.  As a consequence of these arguments, we expect unions will have a positive effect on the 
delivery of non-wage benefits in Ukraine. However, all of the aforementioned research originates in 
western economies which are characterized by well-established and independent trade unions. When 
similar research is performed in CEE countries, the results are remarkably different, particularly in the 
early 1990s, when trade unions struggled to re-organize and to become independent actors. Estrin et al. 
(1997). for example, found no union effect on non-wage benefits in Poland, despite Solidarnosc 
(Solidarity) being one of the most active and well-organized unions in CEE countries. There is also 
ample evidence indicating that trade unions in Eastern European countries have been slow in 
disenfranchising themselves from state control, are plagued by corruption and have not been able to 
organize effectively (Borisov and Clarke 2006; Mailand and Due 2004). This seems to be particularly 
true for Ukraine, as indicated by several ILO reports (ILO 2001; 2004). 
Our final objective is to investigate whether or not trade unions had an effect on firm performance. 
Although not directly relevant for the purpose of our study, we chose to explore this relationship to be 
consistent with the model that was first developed by Estrin et al. (1997) to assess the effects of non-
wage benefits on firm performance in CEEs. This allows us to compare our findings with those of 
previous studies on a ‘like-for-like’ basis. There is a substantial body of research work that considered 
such relationships with this work, however, producing contrasting results. In developed countries, US 
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evidence tends to show a positive effect of unions on productivity, particularly in manufacturing, 
while the UK experience is mixed but negative overall (Altman 2001; Cleveland, Gunderson and 
Hyatt 2003; Metcalf 1989; and Doucouliagos and Laroche 2003). As previously noted, explanations 
for the negative effect on productivity usually rest on the assumption that unions raise labor costs, 
encourage rent-seeking behaviors and constrain the capacity of management to allocate resources 
efficiently. By contrast, research that found a positive relationship emphasizes the fact that, in high-
trust workplaces, productivity can be improved by means of creative bargaining over non-wage issues. 
According to the collective voice/institutional face of unionism perspective, trade unions, by providing 
a ‘collective voice’, offer an opportunity through which differences and dissatisfaction at the 
workplace can be expressed. This, in turn, if offered adequate consideration by management, would 
limit individual ‘exit’ behavior as the collective voice would be a substitute for quitting. In short, 
collective voice is expected to enhance governance of the workplace by reducing turnover also 
improving morale and cooperation. This is, ultimately, expected to have a positive effect on 
productivity (Freeman and Medoff 1984). Trade unions can also foster productivity by forcing 
management to introduce innovative work practices, more training, and ultimately spur innovation. 
This is due to the fact that by blocking the possibility for employers to continuously lower wages, 
trade unions may contribute to create the conditions to innovate and introduce ‘best’ management 
practices. It is not suggested that trade unions will always improve productivity. Rather the interaction 
between management and labor as well as their strategies will have or not have an effect on 
productivity. Positive interactions are usually achieved in high-trust workplaces where management 
and trade unions share information regarding a wide range of issues and productivity may be enhanced 
by means of bargaining over non-wage issues that include technology, training and career 
opportunities.  A condition for the latter to happen is that unions should be free from managerial and 
political influence, and have the resources and capabilities to mobilize employees and bargain with 
management. As previously stated, the available evidence suggests that Ukrainian unions are neither 
independent nor very effective at bargaining with management, and that the situation continued over 
the period considered.  
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4. Empirical Approach 
Hypotheses 
Our review of the prior literature aimed to empirically assess the extent to which privatization – and 
the proliferation of different corporate forms have been associated with the deterioration of a broad 
range of social welfare benefits usually associated with SOEs. Moreover, we sought to assess whether 
such changes have had any significant consequences for establishment performance. In doing so, we 
also proposed to test whether or not the changing role of unions in the Ukrainian economy has been 
associated with any discernible effect on either the provision of such benefits or establishment 
performance. 
To this end, we sought to test a number of related hypotheses. To begin with, we expected that 
different forms of corporate ownership would be correlated with the propensity of an establishment to 
provide social welfare benefits. In particular, we expected that establishments that continued to be run 
as SOEs would provide a wider range of social welfare benefits to employees than do establishments 
that are run as private firms. As previously mentioned, previous studies in both western countries and 
transition economies indicate that non-wage benefits such as retirement assistance, workers’ 
compensation, meal vouchers and seniority based allowances were seriously curtailed or lost 
altogether following privatization as firms strived to raise productivity (see e.g. Pendleton 1999; 
Heseltine and Silcock 1990; Chong and Leon 2009). By contrast, a substantial body of research work 
has found that non-wage benefits, such as health services, subsidized rent, subsidies for kindergartens 
and meal voucher were retained in SOEs in transition economies (Buck, Filatotchev, Demina and 
Wright 2003; Estrin, Shaffer and Singh 1997;). Hence, 
H1:  Non-wage benefits are expected to be more widely adopted by SOEs than privately-owned 
establishments in the post-reform period. 
By contrast, those establishments (irrespective of corporate form) that reported difficulties in meeting 
wage payments would also report higher use of social welfare benefits. As previously mentioned 
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several establishments which encountered financial difficulties during the transition period would 
substitute wages with-non wage benefits to retain skilled staff and to continue to operate in what can 
be considered a substitution effect (Brainerd 1998, Commander and Shankerman 1997). Therefore 
H2:   Establishments reporting financial difficulties are expected to substitute wages with non-wage 
benefits in the post-reform period, everything else being equal.  
The central aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between type of corporate ownership, 
the use of non-wage benefits and establishment performance. Based on the few available studies, we 
expected the use of non-wage benefits will be positively associated with establishment performance, 
irrespective of ownership type. The origin of this relationship is rooted in motivation theory. At the 
theoretical level it is often claimed that non-wage benefits improve motivation and employee 
satisfaction in the same way as monetary incentives (bonuses) do. This process will ultimately have a 
positive effect on employees’ productivity and firm performance (Buck et. Al,  Brown et al. 2006 ; 
Gahan et al. 2012, Preslee et al. 2013). This assumption is further reinforced by empirical evidence 
suggesting that non-wage benefits have often been bundled together with bonuses and western 
style HRM practices in a mix intended to introduce performance based reward systems. In this 
way non-wage benefits and bonuses should be viewed as complements rather than substitutes. 
We therefore expect a close association between non-wage benefits, bonuses and firm performance. 
However, we anticipate that non-wage benefits would have a longer-lasting effect than bonuses as the 
latter would likely be introduced together with other western style HRM practices late in the 1990s. 
(Buck, Filatotchev, Demina and Wright 2003; Brown et al. 2006). This relationship has recently been 
proven to be robust in China (Gahan, Michelotti and Standing 2012) though it is still in a great need to 
be confirmed in CEE countries (Filer, Schneider and Svejnar 1997; Rein and Friedman 1997; 
Commander and Jackman 1997; Tratch and Worgotter 1997; Estrin et al. 1997). Hence, 
H3:  The use of non-wage benefits will be positively associated with establishment performance 
irrespective of ownership type. 
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and 
H4:  The use of monetary incentives (such as bonuses) is expected to be positively associated with 
establishment performance and the delivery of non-wage benefits irrespective of ownership 
type. 
The next hypothesis investigates the relationship between ownership type and firm performance. As 
noted, this issue has generated considerable debate among scholars. On one side, agency theorists and 
supporters of the public choice view of privatization emphasize that private ownership will invariably 
have a positive effect on performance ( Dharwadkar, George and Brands 2000; Laffont & Tirole 1993; 
Veldman 2013). On the other, however, critics, claim that when mediating factors, such as non-
perfectly competitive labor and capital markets are taken into consideration, such positive effect 
becomes less clear (Barberis, Boycko, Shleifer and Tsukanoza 1996; De Castro and Uhlenbruck 
1997). Yet, on balance, the current status quo seems to support the assumptions of agency theorists 
and this also applies, with some exceptions, to most transition economies including former CIS 
countries (Brown, Earle & Telegdy 2006;; Estrin, Hanousek, Kocenda and Svejnar 2009; Estrin, 
Poukliakova and Shapiro 2009; Megginson & Netter 2001). We therefore hypothesize that:    
H5:  Everything else being equal privately-owned establishments are expected to report higher 
performance (productivity) than SOEs. 
Our final objective is to investigate the effect of trade unions on the delivery of non-wage benefits and 
productivity. As previously noted, theory and empirical evidence overwhelmingly support the notion 
that the union effect on non-wage benefits should be positive (Fitzenberger, Kohn and Lembecke 
2013; Freeman and Medoff 1984; Magda, Marsden and Moriconi 2012). Hence, 
H6:  Trade union  presence is expected to be positively associated with the adoption of non-wage 
benefits irrespective of firm type. 
By contrast, the trade union effect on productivity is far less certain (Altman 2001; Cleveland, 
Gunderson and Hyatt 2003; Metcalf 1989; and Doucouliagos and Laroche 2003). Given their 
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institutional weakness corruption and connections with the political parties (Borisov and Clarke 2006; 
Mailand and Due 2004), we do not expect that Ukrainian unions will be able to raise productivity 
using a voice/institutional mechanism. As such, we argue that it is reasonable to deduce that such an 
effect will be neutral at best, or negative, as strong unions may be able to use rent-seeking tactics as 
anticipated by the Monopoly Face of Union perspective. Therefore,  
H7:  Trade unions will have, over the 1994-2004 period, a neutral or negative effect on firm 
performance in Ukraine. 
Data description 
In order to test these hypotheses, we used data from two unpublished surveys undertaken by the 
International Labour Office (ILO) as part of its cross-national Enterprise Labour Flexibility and 
Security (ELFS) survey program. The ILO has conducted a number of ELFS surveys in various 
developing countries and transition economies in Asia, the Americas and Eastern Europe.  In order to 
compare data on HRM practices, wages, and employee benefits and labor relations across these groups 
of countries, the ELFS survey consisted of a core questionnaire design, which was then adapted and 
extended in each country (Standing and Zsoldos, 1995, 2001). As a result, the ELFS surveys enable 
cross-national comparison, but, at the same time, ensure valid responses by adjusting individual 
measures to reflect local conditions that can be easily understood and answered by respondents. 
We were granted access to two waves of ELFS in Ukraine, collected in 1995 and 2004. The surveys 
collected establishment-level data for a two-year period: the year in which the survey was undertaken, 
and the 12-month period prior to the survey year (i.e. 1994/1995 and 2003/2004). In order to simplify 
the presentation of the results, we refer to responses for 1994 and 2004 as the years represented by the 
data, assuming that few companies changed their ownership form between January and February. A 
sample of 556 and 2082 manufacturing establishments were surveyed in 1995 and 2004 respectively. 
The samples were selected using a random start, with the probability of being selected based on 
population proportions according to employment size and sector, with replacement of non-
respondents. Table 1 reports the characteristics of establishments including the final sample used in 
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the study. The respondent establishments were evenly distributed throughout the country and 
represented 15 industrial sectors. The mechanical engineering, metalworking and food processing 
sectors are the largest industries represented in both samples, followed by light industry and the 
construction material industry. 
------------------------------------------ 
Table I about here 
------------------------------------------ 
The ELFS survey questionnaires more closely resemble an official census than an academic survey, 
both in terms of the types of questions asked and in the sense that participation of selected firms was 
compulsory (Buck et al. 2003). Like other ELFS, the Ukrainian surveys consist of two parts 
administered at different times (in February 1993 and 1994, and February 2003 and 2004). The 
Ukrainian Ministry of Statistics administered both parts of the survey. Face-to-face interviews were 
conducted with senior managers, usually accompanied by ILO staff. The first part of the survey was 
completed by a financial representative (a firm accountant or financial officer), and contains questions 
relating to establishment characteristics, the establishment’s revenue and cost structure, resource 
allocation, the number and characteristics of employees, wages and other non-wage labor costs. The 
second part, which was administered to senior HR and operational managers, consisted of questions 
about a broad range of employment arrangements, labor management practices and employee 
outcomes (Buck et al. 2003; Standing and Zsoldos 1995, 2001). 
Interviewers and supervisors of the fieldwork were trained using a common training manual. Training 
sessions detailed the basic concepts underlying the survey questions and items, and appropriate 
interview techniques. This process also led to some rewording of the questionnaire to remove the 
potential for misunderstanding terms. Data reliability was enhanced as two or more visits were often 
undertaken to firms and, in addition, random field checks were made to monitor the interviewers’ 
accuracy. The design for data collection also had a number of significant features. First, the survey 
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instrument relied on objective data, with no attempt to collect information about management or 
employee attitudes. Second, the use of multiple informants minimized the likelihood that the method 
of data collection would contribute to correlation between variables (common method variance). 
Third, the use of key informants with appropriate knowledge of the information to be collected 
provided a greater level of confidence in the quality of the information collected. Overall, the survey 
process allowed for the collection of detailed information in a more reliable way than is often 
associated with surveys using key informants. 
Variables 
PERFORMANCE. This study measured firm performance using the natural logarithm of sales per 
employee in each of the two years for which we have data (i.e., 1994 and 2004). The use of this 
measure was slightly complicated as on 2-16 September 1996 Ukraine carried out a monetary reform. 
The National Bank of Ukraine introduced Hryvnia as the monetary unit, converting 1 Hryvnia = 
100,000 Karbovanets. To allow for meaningful comparison across these two periods, the value of the 
2004 figures were firstly deflated up to 1996 using the official Consumer Prices Index and then 
reconverted to the nominal value of the original currency in Karbovanets of 1994. 
Sales per employee has been a commonly used proxy measure of establishment performance in several 
studies across cognate disciplines such as the economics of organization, finance, accounting and 
management studies, as well as studies seeking to estimate the relationship between HR practices and 
organizational performance (Gahan, Michelotti and Standing 2012). Sun, Aryee and Law (2007; p. 
567) suggest that this is an appropriate measure of organizational performance because “it provides a 
single index that can be used to compare a firm’s productivity as well as to estimate the dollar value of 
returns for investments in employees through high-performance human resource practices. This 
measure of productivity reflects employee efforts that are somewhat insulated from variations in the 
capital and product markets.”1 Importantly, and despite its apparent limitations, sales per employee has 
also been used extensively as a robust proxy for firm performance by studies that utilized ELFS 
surveys (see e.g. Gahan et al. 2012 and Buck et al. 2013).  
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We are nonetheless aware that sales per employee can be problematic, particularly when used in a 
transition context. In particular, sales/employee can overstate the productivity effect for two main 
reasons (Gahan et al. 2012). First, firms may produce more than what is optimal to reduce stock and 
sell at lower margin. Second, the number of employees may under- or over-report the number of active 
employees in the enterprise. In most countries companies tend to under-report the number of 
employees in order to avoid legal constraints and to pay social security contributions. However, in 
Ukraine firms that downsized often did so by putting workers on unpaid leave in order to avoid 
compensation payments, which artificially inflates the number of reported employees. People on 
unpaid leave would still receive some of the social benefits associated with employment while earning 
their living in the large informal sector that developed in Ukraine in the 1990s (Williams & Round 
2007). Despite these limitations, we believe that sales per employee can still provide some very useful 
information in the Ukrainian context as participation was compulsory and firms were encouraged by 
the Ukrainian authorities to be as transparent as possible in reporting their responses.  
NON-WAGE BENEFITS. The ELFS surveys contain a range of items intended to capture whether 
different types of non-wage benefits are provided at the establishment level, and to whom they are 
made available. Among non-managerial workers, the surveys distinguish between two types of 
employees: (1) regular employees; and (2) non-regular (i.e., temporary) employees; and asks whether 
they were entitled to receive specific social welfare benefits. The social welfare items included in our 
measure were selected from a range of 34 items using Confirmatory Factor Analysis, with a robust 
weighted least squares estimator using a diagonal weight matrix (WLSMV hereafter), and making use 
of Delta2 parameterization which is available in Mplus 7.3 (Muthén and Muthén 2014). When dealing 
with categorical and continuous outcomes, the WLSMV produces robust parameter estimates (Flora 
and Curran 2004; Muthén et al. 1997). As a result, nine variables were selected covering five different 
benefits: paid health services, subsidized rent, subsidies for kindergartens, subsidized consumer goods, 
and subsidies for canteen or a benefit for a meal. All except the last were measured for regular workers 
with a permanent work contract, and for non-regular workers with a temporary work contract. The 
subsidy for canteen and meal were only included for regular workers. After due consideration, the 
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variables were modeled into two factors that were named ‘Consumption Benefits’ and ‘Welfare 
benefits’ respectively. ‘Consumption benefits’ refers to goods that are generally associated with 
consumption and included the following items: canteen/meal vouchers for regular workers, consumer 
goods for regular workers and consumer goods for non-regular workers. The factor ‘Welfare benefits’ 
relates to services and allowances usually offered by publicly or privately run welfare systems and  
included health services for regular workers, health services for non-regular workers, subsidized rent 
for regular workers, subsidized rent for non-regular workers, kindergarten for regular workers and 
kindergartens for non-regular workers. The variables were exactly the same for both data sets (e.g., 
1994 and 2004), and were measured on a scale of: 1=Yes; 2=No; 3=Occasionally; 4=N/A; and 
5=Don’t know. As 4 and 5 were not meaningful categories, they were transformed into ‘missing 
values’ and the scale was re-coded into: 0=No; 1=Occasionally; and 2=Yes. Importantly, none of these 
benefits was legally mandated or, in other words, these provisions were offered by firms on a 
voluntary basis. 
BONUSES: HRM managers were asked in 1994 and 2004 whether or not establishments had provided 
performance based bonuses to employees in the past 12 months. The variable bonus was measured by 
the item Operated monetary incentive scheme (bonuses)/Year and were codes 1=Yes 2=No.  The 
scale was re-coded into 0=No; 1=Yes. 
DIFFICULTIES IN PAYING WAGES. This variable was taken from a single-item question in the 
survey which asked whether the establishment had experienced difficulties in making payment of 
wages to their employees over the last 12 months. In both survey years, this item consisted of a 
dichotomous variable: 1=Yes; 2=No. The scale was re-coded into: 0=No; 1=Yes. This measure was 
included in our model to estimate the extent to which financial problems may have an effect on the 
likelihood that firms under financial strain would elect to substitute wages with non-monetary benefits. 
This, if confirmed, would introduce a bias as the use of non-wage benefits in lieu of monetary 
payments would overestimate the size of the effect of non-wage benefits.  
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UNION PRESENCE. Managers were asked whether they had recognized trade unions in their 
establishment:1 =Yes; 2=No; 3=Don’t know. Again, “Don’t know” was re-coded as ‘missing values’, 
while the others became: 0=No; 1=Yes. 
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP. Establishment ownership status was measured using State-owned, 
Open Joint Stock and Closed Joint Stock. These items were coded as dummy variables (0,1). They 
capture the three main types of ownership common across the two data sets. 
Data Analysis 
The data were analyzed using Structural Equation Modeling (SEM hereafter) which allowed us to 
estimate simultaneously latent (e.g., unobserved) and measured (e.g., observed) variables. We utilized 
a similar type of data analysis to that performed by Buck et al. (2003) on a similar data set, for broadly 
similar purposes but for a different year. Given the polytomous structure of the data at hand, even in 
this instance, we utilized Mplus 7.3 (Muthén and Muthén 2014) with the WLSMV estimator using the 
Delta parameterization. First, column vectors were transposed to row vectors. In doing so, the data 
were able to be stacked in one single matrix in order to produce a pooled model across the two 
different time-periods. Notably, as firms could have been surveyed in both waves, the observations in 
the pooled data set would fail to be independent and identically distributed. To avoid such an 
eventuality, we instructed the software to recognize the clustered structure of the data (where the 
‘cluster’ is the ‘firm identification’) and to remedy possible standard error biases given by the non-
independent observations. 
Also, because two models were to be compared, we analyzed the data making use of ‘multigroup 
analysis’ where the two configured groups were the two time-periods. Before proceeding with such an 
analysis, however, we first established how to better configure the latent variable “Benefits”. We 
undertook an analysis of modification indices in addition to conceptual considerations. A few 
confirmatory factor analysis iterations were performed until we attained parsimony for the latent 
variable. Throughout this iterative process, we established that such a factor was better configured as 
being a second-order latent. In doing so, the error residuals of the six variables referring to regular and 
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non-regular workers benefitting from subsidized consumer goods, paid health services and subsidized 
rent, were correlated, as they had identical wording. 
We then followed the recommendations given by Muthén and Christoffersson (1981) and Muthén and 
Asparouhov (2002). We first fitted the model separately in each group. The models yielded: (1) χ2(df=23) 
= 67.76 P = 0.000 and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA hereafter) = 0.062; and 
(2) χ2(df=23) = 66.85 P = 0.000 and RMSEA = 0.035 for the 1994 and 2004 data sets, respectively. After, 
we fitted the model in all groups allowing all parameters to be free except for factor means, which are 
fixed to zero in all groups, and scale factors which are fixed to one in all groups. In this case, the 
model yielded χ2(df=53) = 178.28 (of which 100.14 was part of Group1 [1994 data], and 78.14 of Group 
2 [2004 data]) P = 0.000 and RMSEA = 0.035. 
Consequently, we fitted the model in the two groups holding factor loadings and thresholds equal 
across the groups, with factor means fixed to zero in the first group and free in the other group, and 
scale factors fixed to one in the first group and free in the other group. However, after running such a 
model, we observed that we did not reach measurement invariance, as the WLSMV χ2 test for 
difference testing resulted in χ2(df=7) = 39.57 P = 0.000. Therefore, with the help of modification 
indices, and after scrutiny of the unstandardized λ coefficients, we relaxed the equality constrains of 
the variables “paid health services for regular workers” and “subsidised rent for regular workers” 
(fixing the thresholds and scale factors of the two variables to a value of 1), and re-estimated a new 
model, on this occasion, successfully, as the WLSMV χ2 test for difference testing resulted in χ2(df=5) = 
1.10 P = 0.954, indicating that partial measurement invariance was achieved. 
At this point, within the multigroup analysis, we ran the structural model, whereby, in order to avoid 
problems of endogeneity, we tested wether all the endogenous structural residuals were significantly 
correlated. The tests showed insignificant residual correlations (p<0.05) hence we left such parameters 
freely estimated to avoid over fitting the model.  
The model yielded χ2 (df=178) =294.97 (of which 135.31 was part of Group1 [1994 data], and 159.65 of 
Group 2 [2004 data]) P = 0.000, Comparative Fit Index (CFI hereafter) = 0.977, Tucker-Lewis Index 
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(TLI hereafter) = 0.972, and RMSEA = 0.025 (P RMSEA ≤ 0.05=1.000). Such fit ratios were deemed 
satisfactory to not reject the substantive model. The model is graphically exhibited in Figure 3 3. 
Descriptive statistics are reported in Tables 2, 3 and 4, while the correlation matrix is reported in Table 
5. 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 3 proposed model about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
5. Results 
Our analysis yields a number of interesting and significant results, although not all of our initial 
hypotheses were supported. The structural relationships reported above indicate that public and private 
ownership had a very similar effect on the delivery of non-wage benefits across the two years. While 
in 1994 all types of establishments were associated with the delivery of non-wage benefits, by 2004 
this relationship was insignificant for all of them. Hypothesis 1 is therefore not confirmed.  As Table 6 
below indicates the relationship between financial distress and the use of non-wage benefits remained 
insignificant in both years. This appears to suggest that benefits were never used as substitutes for 
wages in arrears across the two years. Consequently, hypothesis 2 is also not confirmed.   
In considering hypothesis 3, which focuses on the relationship between non-wage benefits and sales 
per employee, we found a significant and positive effect across the two years. Such relationship 
indicates that the delivery of non-wage benefits remained strongly associated with positive firm 
performance across the period considered and supports hypothesis 3. Moreover, the existence of 
monetary incentives (bonuses) was positively associated with both non-wage benefits and 
performance but only in the year 2004. Therefore hypothesis 4 is supported only for that year. 
 26 
Hypothesis 5 considers the relationship between property type and performance. We could not find 
any positive or negative relationships between type of ownership and sales per employee. Path 
coefficients remained insignificant for each property type across the two surveys and therefore, a 
causality effect between the exogenous and endogenous variables could not be established. Hence 
hypothesis 5 is not confirmed.  
Hypothesis 6 centers on the relationship between trade unions and the delivery of non-wage benefits. 
We could not find any positive relationship in 1994 or 2004 as path coefficients remained insignificant 
for both years. Therefore this hypothesis is not supported.  Hypothesis 7 investigates the effect of trade 
unions on firm performance. This relationship was not significant in 1994 but became significant and 
negative in 2004, revealing an inverse relationship between the presence of trade unions and 
performance. Hypothesis 7 is thus confirmed for both years.  
The structural results and a summary of hypotheses testing are reported in Table 6. 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 6 (structural results and hypotheses testing) about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
To what extent has privatization been the catalyst for improved firm performance in a transition 
context? What is the relationship between types of corporate ownership, non-wage benefits and 
performance? To what extent do institutional actors, such as trade unions, have an influence on 
performance and monetary and non-monetary payments? After more than 20 years of reforms in 
Central and Eastern Europe, and 30 years in the western world, these questions are still salient, as 
available empirical evidence continues to be scarce and contradictory. In this paper we considered 
these relationships in Ukraine over a 10-year period, using a unique high-quality data set.  
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Our results yield some very interesting findings. When the relationship between type of ownership and 
the delivery of non-wage benefits was considered, we found that SOEs were not more directly 
associated with the delivery of non-wage benefits than other types of ownership. Interestingly, in 
1994, all types of firms were delivering non-wage benefits. This is to be expected as many open and 
closed stock firms had just been privatized and, therefore, their management practices had remained 
either unchanged or were a mix of new and old practices. By 2004 type of ownership ceased to be a 
significant factor influencing this relationship. This, coupled with the fact that non-wage benefits 
remained strongly associated with firm performance (see hypothesis 4) would seem to suggest that 
these incentives had become an integral part of HRM practices in Ukraine irrespective of ownership 
type. This calls into question some of the findings of earlier studies which argued that the delivery of 
non-wage benefits remained strongly associated with SOEs (see for example Estrin, Shaffer and Singh 
1997; Buck, Filatotchev, Demina and Wright 2003).   
Perhaps the most relevant result of our analysis is that we found a significant and positive effect 
between non-wage benefits and sales per employee over the period considered. In other words, firms 
that continued to deliver non-wage benefits also performed better. The robustness of this finding is 
further supported by the fact that monetary incentives such as bonuses also proved to yield a positive 
relationship with both productivity and non-wage benefits. However, while non-wage benefits had a 
positive effect on performance across the two surveys, bonus payments were linked to both 
performance and the delivery of non-wage benefits only for the year 2004. This indicates that a) non-
wage benefits had become over time a central element of HRM practices in Ukraine b) There is a 
positive association between non-wage benefits and bonuses in the sense that firms that are performing 
well tend to offer both types of incentives. This reveals that as western style HRM practices are 
introduced, bonuses are a complement rather than a substitute for non-wage benefits c) In Ukraine 
non-wage benefits act as a motivator in the same way as monetary payments do.  
Furthermore, we could not find any substitution effect between non-wage benefits and wages. This 
further strengthens our claim that the retention of non-wage benefits has become a key requirement to 
retain staff and a distinctive feature of HRM practices in Ukraine. This finding is interesting in its own 
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right, particularly for research that considers the link between the adoption of western-style HRM 
practices and firm performance in transition economies. Our results indicate that non-wage benefits, 
supposedly a relic of the communist era, continue to play a central role in influencing firm 
performance alongside new HRM practices such as monetary rewards. This also supports theory and 
empirical evidence claiming that non-wage benefits have a similar effect on productivity as monetary 
payments and that there is a positive relationship between the delivery of non-wage benefits, employee 
satisfaction, productivity and ultimately firm performance (Buck et al. 2003; Brown et al. 2006; Gahan 
et al. 2012). 
An important purpose of this paper was also to consider the relationship between type of ownership 
and performance. Our results indicate that privatization had no significant effect on sales per employee 
suggesting that types of ownership by itself were not directly linked to increases in productivity. Given 
that the debate on privatization and performance is far from concluded, our findings cast serious 
doubts even on the most recent positive assessments of the privatization process in CEE countries in 
general and in former CIS nations in particular (see, for example, Brown et al. 2006; 2010). We also 
did not find any direct evidence supporting claims made by ‘agency’ theorists or by enthusiasts of the 
public ‘choice’ view of privatization.  As previously stated, the boundaries between private and public 
ownership remained blurred during the 1994-2004 period making a definite assessment of the impact 
of privatization on firm performance difficult.    
Finally, we found that the presence of trade unions was not associated with the delivery of non-wage 
benefits and had a negative effect on performance (in 2004 only). We included trade unions in our 
exogenous variables for reasons of consistency with the original model tested by Estrin et al. in 1997. 
Our hypotheses assumed a neutral or negative effect of unions on both non-wage benefits and 
performance. We based our hypotheses on available empirical evidence that indicates that unions in 
Ukraine would be either ineffective or corrupt. Our results support this conclusion. In line with the 
Monopoly face of union theoretical perspective we interpreted the negative relationship between trade 
unions and sales per employee as evidence of rent-seeking behavior (ILO 2004). However, we would 
like to emphasize the fact that the current analysis was performed at the national level. The results may 
 29 
change significantly if this relationship had been investigated at the industry level. In particular, we 
anticipate that in sectors where unions are notoriously effective, such as in mining, the presence of 
Institutional/Voice mechanisms may be detected.  
By way of conclusion, we believe that our results are, in many respects, interesting and important for 
debates centered on institutional change and firm performance in transition economies. The picture 
that emerges from our analysis is one of continuity and change, with non-wage benefits playing a 
critical role for both HRM practices and employees while privatization, by itself, had almost no effect 
on sales per employee and the delivery of non-wage benefits. 
We believe that our results also add complexity not just to the literature on labor market and welfare 
changes in transition economies, but also to debates focused on convergence and economic 
globalization. Our findings tend to support the proposition that there are strong similarities as well as 
differences between CEE countries. In particular, we agree with the conclusion of Filatotchev et al. 
(2000), Buck et al. (2003), Commander and Jackman (1997), and Tratch and Worgotter (1997) that the 
retention of non-wage benefits has been a key element of HRM developments in Ukraine and Russia, 
but not in other former socialist countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Although 
limited in its scope, this study appears to call into question the claims of institutional or labor practice 
convergence to a single model in transition economies. 
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Endnotes 
1   Capelli and Neumark (2001) have also argued that financial measures, such as profitability, 
may not be the most appropriate measures to assess performance in multi-establishment firms. 
This is so because firms may use different methods for calculating internal measures of plant-
level performance, particularly where some production costs may be borne by the firm rather 
than the establishment. 
2 In the Delta parameterization, scale factors for continuous latent response variables of 
observed categorical dependent variables are allowed to be parameters in the model, but 
residual variances for continuous latent response variables are not; as opposed to the Theta 
parameterization, where residual variances for continuous latent response variables of 
observed categorical dependent variables are allowed to be parameters in the model, but scale 
factors for continuous latent response variables are not. In both cases, however, WLSMV 
produces Probit estimates. 
3  The variables canteen/meal for regular workers, consumption goods for regular workers and 
consumption goods for non-regular workers were defined as ‘consumption benefits’. Health 
services for regular workers, health services for non-regular workers, subsidized rent for 
regular workers, subsidized rent for non-regular workers, kindergartens for regular workers, 
kindergartens for non-regular workers were labelled welfare benefits.  
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Table 1:  
Establishment Characteristics 
 
Establishment Characteristics 
Number of 
establishments 
1994 % 
Number of 
establishments 
2004 % 
Establishment size     
1-100                       54  9.5%                      698  33.5% 
101-250                     121  21.4%                      631  30.3% 
251-500                     131  23.1%                      339  16.3% 
501+                     260  45.9%                      414  19.9% 
Ownership type     
State                     286  50.5%                      253  12.2% 
Leasehold                     142  25.1%   
Private                       26  4.6%                      435  20.9% 
Closed JS                       41  7.2%                      325  15.6% 
Open JS                       51  9.0%                      867  41.6% 
Collective                       16  2.8%   
Association                        3  0.5%   
Other                        1  0.2%                      202  9.7% 
Location     
Donetsk                       49  8.7%                       87  4.2% 
Lviv                       56  9.9%                       76  3.7% 
Mykolaiv                       58  10.2%                       78  3.7% 
Kyiv city                       43  7.6%                       87  4.2% 
Kyiv obl.                       50  8.8%                       76  3.7% 
Kharkiv                       50  8.8%                       76  3.7% 
Dnipropetrovsk                       45  8.0%                       84  4.0% 
Zaporizhzhya                       41  7.2%                       76  3.7% 
Odesa                       48  8.5%                       80  3.8% 
Poltava                       44  7.8%                       85  4.1% 
Chernivtsy                       37  6.5%                       77  3.7% 
Chernigiv                       45  8.0%                       75  3.6% 
Crimea                         88  4.2% 
Vinnitsa                         82  3.9% 
Volyn                         76  3.7% 
Zhytomir                         86  4.1% 
Zakarpatye                         95  4.6% 
Ivano-Frankivsk                         79  3.8% 
Kirovograd                         50  2.4% 
Lugansk                         86  4.1% 
Rivne                         63  3.0% 
Sumy                         73  3.5% 
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Establishment Characteristics 
Number of 
establishments 
1994 % 
Number of 
establishments 
2004 % 
Ternopil                         75  3.6% 
Kherson                         80  3.8% 
Khmelnitsky                         84  4.0% 
Cherkasy                         81  3.9% 
Sevastopol City                           27  1.3% 
Establishment Age     
Less than 5 years                       25  4.4%                      148  7.1% 
5 but less than 10 years                       20  3.5%                      248  11.9% 
10 or more years old                     519  91.7%                   1,682  80.8% 
Don't know                           2  0.1% 
Industry         
Energy industry                       12  2.1%                       58  2.8% 
Fuel industry                       12  2.1%                       59  2.8% 
Ferrous Metallurgy industry                       19  3.4%                       57  2.7% 
Machinebuilding and Metals 
industry                     162  28.6%                      477  22.9% 
Non-ferrous Metallurgy                        2  0.4%                       21  1.0% 
Chemical and Petrochemical 
industry                       34  6.0%                      109  5.2% 
Wood and Paper industry                       25  4.4%                      130  6.2% 
Construction Materials industry                       57  10.1%                      179  8.6% 
Glass and Pottery, China industry                        3  0.5%                       24  1.2% 
Light industry                       83  14.7%                      203  9.8% 
Food processing industry                     117  20.7%                      532  25.6% 
Microbiological industry                        2  0.4%                         3  0.1% 
Bakery, Serial and Feedstuff 
industry                        5  0.9%                       52  2.5% 
Medical industry                        9  1.6%                       27  1.3% 
Printing industry                       14  2.5%                       89  4.3% 
Other branches of industry                       10  1.8%                       62  3.0% 
Total 566 100.0%                  2,082  100.0% 
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Table 2:  
Univariate higher-order moment descriptive statistics for 1994 and 2004 
Variable N  Mean/  Skewness/ Minimum/ % with   Percentiles   
Year    Variance  Kurtosis Maximum  Min/Max  20%/60%  40%/80%  Median 
Performance  457 -2.76 1.334 -8.42 0.22% -3.834 -3.245 -2.952 
1994   2.315 5.342 4.932 0.22% -2.66 -1.787   
  1648 0.032 -0.248 -5.167 0.06% -0.984 -0.253 0.047 
2004   1.64 0.79 4.482 0.06% 0.369 1.041   
State owned 459 0.706 -0.904 0 29.41% 0 1 1 
1994   0.208 -1.183 1 70.59% 1 1   
  1694 0.096 2.75 0 90.44% 0 0 0 
2004   0.086 5.563 1 9.56% 0 0   
Open join stock 459 0.094 2.789 0 90.63% 0 0 0 
1994   0.085 5.778 1 9.37% 0 0   
  1694 0.43 0.281 0 56.97% 0 0 0 
2004   0.245 -1.921 1 43.03% 1 1   
Closed join stock 459 0.083 3.028 0 91.72% 0 0 0 
1994   0.076 7.169 1 8.28% 0 0   
  1694 0.151 1.955 0 84.95% 0 0 0 
2004   0.128 1.82 1 15.05% 0 0   
Trade union presence 459 0.965 -5.072 0 3.49% 1 1 1 
1994   0.156 0.39 1 80.58% 1 1   
  1694 0.806 -1.546 0 19.42% 1 1 1 
2004   0.172 -0.171 1 78.01% 1 1   
Bonus on previous year 459 0.784 -1.383 0 21.57% 0 1 1 
1994   0.169 -0.089 1 78.43% 1 1   
  1694 0.838 -1.831 0 16.23% 1 1 1 
2004   0.136 1.354 1 83.77% 1 1   
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Table 3: 
Means Intercepts Thresholds  
 
  
1994 2004 
Paid health services for regular workers   $1 -0.206 1.403 
  $2 0.127 1.765 
Paid health services for non-regular workers  $1 0.488 1.957 
  $2 0.596 2.199 
Subsidized rent for regular workers  $1 0.845 2.576 
  $2 1.014 2.744 
Subsidized rent for non-regular workers  $1 1.12 2.697 
  $2 1.218 2.846 
Subsidies for kindergartens for regular workers  $1 1.571 1.981 
  $2 1.666 2.187 
Subsidies for kindergartens for non-regular workers   $1 1.245 2.359 
  $2 1.288 2.498 
Subsidy for canteen or benefit for meal for regular workers   $1 0.685 1.774 
  $2 0.872 1.815 
Subsidized consumer goods for regular workers  $1 0.381 1.866 
  $2 0.688 1.951 
Subsidized consumer goods for non-regular workers $1 1.067 2.094 
  $2 1.274 2.193 
Value of sales    -2.582 -0.489 
Difficulty to pay wages, last 12 months   -0.315 0.536 
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Table 4: 
Slopes 
 
  
 State Owned   Open  j. stock   Closed j. stock   TU presence   Bonus  p.y.  
  
1994 2004 1994 2004 1994 2004 1994 2004 1994 2004 
Paid health services for 
regular workers 
 
0.639 0.476 0.489 0.157 0.647 0.145 -0.522 0.321 -0.056 0.920 
Paid health services for non-
regular workers 
 
0.391 0.232 -0.329 0.115 0.447 0.183 -0.447 0.396 -0.059 0.742 
Subsidized rent for regular 
workers 
 
0.967 0.697 1.279 0.218 0.829 0.172 -0.180 0.255 -0.154 0.927 
Subsidized rent for non-
regular workers 
 
0.320 0.701 -3.201 0.377 0.346 0.048 -0.582 -0.203 -0.014 0.775 
Subsidies for kindergartens 
for regular workers 
 
0.242 0.795 0.282 0.357 0.124 0.209 1.203 0.230 0.020 0.628 
Subsidies for kindergartens 
for non-regular workers 
 
0.173 0.232 0.695 0.331 -0.028 -0.205 0.095 0.150 -0.247 0.569 
Subsidy for canteen or 
benefit for meal for regular 
workers 
 
0.348 0.481 0.238 0.156 0.451 0.253 0.813 0.394 0.015 0.885 
Subsidized consumer goods 
for regular workers 
 
0.435 -0.151 0.317 -0.059 0.737 0.071 -0.318 0.395 -0.005 0.707 
Subsidized consumer goods 
for non-regular workers 
 
0.241 -0.102 0.352 -0.073 0.207 0.053 0.096 0.497 0.147 0.525 
Value of sales 
 
-0.100 0.141 -0.251 0.068 -0.142 0.180 0.004 -0.441 -0.096 0.959 
Difficulty to pay wages, last 
12 months 
 
0.423 0.295 0.574 0.212 -0.004 0.285 -0.124 0.029 -0.186 0.000 
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Table 5: 
Correlation Matrix 
 
 
P268 P269 P271 P272 P274 P275 P298 P301 P302 P22_3 P388 
 P268 -- 0.854 0.439 0.252 0.607 0.486 0.319 0.232 0.201 0.176 0.022 
 P269 0.791 -- 0.324 0.506 0.452 0.746 0.245 0.152 0.355 0.103 -0.055 
 P271 0.575 0.480 -- 0.883 0.729 0.623 0.24 0.389 0.231 0.102 0.043 
 P272 0.461 0.701 0.692 -- 0.511 0.765 0.249 0.346 0.446 -0.039 0.007 
 P274 0.450 0.385 0.667 0.491 -- 0.913 0.401 0.403 0.434 0.193 0.099 
 P275 0.221 0.611 0.526 0.892 0.846 -- 0.161 0.248 0.446 0.074 0.096 
 P298 0.413 0.148 0.418 0.105 0.427 0.133 -- 0.554 0.528 0.189 -0.003 
 P301 0.421 0.147 0.450 0.223 0.334 0.183 0.608 -- 0.967 0.011 -0.07 
 P302 0.237 0.431 0.302 0.540 0.395 0.496 0.456 0.914 -- 0.072 -0.041 
 P22_3 0.136 0.024 0.300 0.127 0.086 0.090 0.184 0.131 0.039 -- 0.051 
 P388 0.017 -0.030 -0.169 0.427 0.068 0.138 0.092 0.189 0.240 -0.108 -- 
 
 
 
Note: 1994 in lower diagonal and 2004 in upper diagonal (shaded). P268= Paid health services for regular workers 
 
 
 
P269= Paid health services for non-regular workers, P271= Subsidized rent for regular workers, P272=Subsidized rent for non-regular 
workers, P274=Subsidies for kinder gardens for regular workers, P275= Subsidies for kinder gardens for non-regular workers, 
P298=Subsidy for canteen or benefit for meal for regular workers, P301=Subsidized consumer goods for regular workers 
P302=Subsidized consumer goods for non-regular workers, P22_3=Value of sales, P388=Subsidized consumer goods for regular workers 
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Table 6: 
Structural Results and 
Hypothesis Testing 
 
 
 
 
   
    1994       2004             Hypothesis 
   
Unstand. SE t-value p-value Unstand. SE t-value p-value   Confirmed  
   
estimate       estimate       # Yes/No 
State Owned  Overall benefits 0.354 0.149 2.377 0.017 0.305 0.161 1.888 NS  H1 No 
Open Joint Stock  Overall benefits 0.378 0.178 2.121 0.034 0.120 0.075 1.602 NS  H1 No 
Closed Joined Stock  Overall benefits  0.353 0.184 1.922 0.055 0.114 0.078 1.458 NS  H1 No 
Overall benefits   Difficulties in paying wages 0.372 0.256 1.457 NS 0.110 0.150 0.733 NS  H2 No 
Overall benefits  Performance  0.752 0.297 2.536 0.011 0.622 0.326 1.906 0.057  H3 Yes 
Bonus  Performance  -0.069 0.181 -0.381 NS 0.597 0.115 5.211 0.000  H4 Yes (only 2004) 
Bonus   Overall benefits  -0.037 0.087 -0.427 NS 0.581 0.275 2.115 0.034  H4 Yes (only 2004) 
Closed Joint Stock   Performance  -0.409 0.401 -1.02 NS 0.109 0.099 1.102 NS  H5 No 
State Owned   Performance  -0.369 0.291 -1.269 NS -0.050 0.135 -0.369 NS  H5 No 
Open Joint Stock   Performance  -0.528 0.467 -1.132 NS -0.007 0.080 -0.085 NS  H5 No 
Trade Unions  Overall benefits  -0.080 0.147 -0.544 NS 0.248 0.135 1.837 NS  H6 No 
Trade Unions   Performance  0.072 0.673 0.107 NS -0.595 0.090 -6.607 0.000  H7 Yes 
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Figure 1:  
Number of SOEs privatised (Annual) Ukraine, 1992-2004 
 
 
 
 
   Source: Data are taken from Pleines (2008, p. 1178), Table 1.not in refs 
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Figure 2:  
Private sector share of GDP, 1992-2004 
 
 
 
Source: Data are taken from Pleines (2008, p. 1178), Table 1not in refs 
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Figure 3:   
Model’s Diagram 
 
 
 
